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Migrations during the Soviet Period and 
in the Early Years of USSR’s Dissolution: 
A Focus on Central Asia
Delia RAHMONOVA-SCHWARZ1
Central Asia is a region with strong migratory dynamics. Migration patterns from Central Asia have their roots in the policies of the Soviet state on 
mobility and labor. As this volume comprises a number of interesting country-speciic 
cases, it is important to bear in mind that the region as a whole has for the past century 
witnessed various lows of in − and out − migrations including state-forced resettlements 
during the Soviet people. The present article has the objective to describe on the one 
hand state-forced migration movements during the Soviet period, and on the other hand, 
the opportunities for and restrictions on mobility that inluenced the migration patterns 
during this time. These migration-related historical developments should be drawn to the 
attention of scholars studying the current migration lows within the region as well as 
between the region as the place of origin and other countries of migrant destination.
Central Asia is also home to people who represent various ethnic groups and 
languages. For example, there are ethnic Uzbeks, Russians, Koreans and Tatars in 
Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan or a Tajik-speaking population in some parts of Uzbekistan, 
ethnic Russians, Uigurs and many other minorities in Kazakhstan, Uzbeks and Russians in 
Turkmenistan. Scholars dealing with migration from Central Asia to Russia, a major point 
of destination, to Kazakhstan or beyond the post-Soviet territory are often confronted 
with this ethnic heterogeneity. This article also sheds light on movements of people in 
the context of state nationality policies during the Soviet period. Finally, this contribution 
shows that labor-induced migration as seen on the post-Soviet territory had begun prior to 
the dissolution of the USSR.
1 Policy Support Oficer, OSCE Conlict Prevention Centre, Wallnerstrasse 6, 1010 Vienna, Austria; 
schwarzdelia@web.de
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THE EARLY YEARS OF MOBILITY CONTROL IN PRE-SOVIET 
RUSSIA
Any person travelling nowadays to Russia or to some countries of the former 
Soviet Union has been confronted with a mandatory registration of residence, known in 
Russian as propiska or registraciia. Researchers of post-Soviet migrations have without a 
doubt heard from both internal migrants within Central Asian countries or in the Russian 
Federation about their dificulties obtaining legal documents of which propiska is an 
important part. Resident registration has an interesting history. Some scholars hold Tsar 
Peter the Great responsible for the initial concept of registering population in order to 
engage more recruitees for his reformed army, collect taxes, and rule with more law and 
order than his predecessors (Garcelon, 2001: 90). Others argue that as early as the end 
of the 16th century the tsars kept a systematic registration of peasants who were bound to 
work for the feudal lords (Matthews, 1993: 1).
Under the regulations of the Russian tsars, the individual choice for mobility, 
particularly among the peasants, was limited. Movements of people took place for 
commercial or professional reasons whereas personal travels were highly restricted. 
However, subjects of higher ranks such as nobles and higher military personnel were 
issued permanent passports and enjoyed freedom of movement. The lower the rank, the 
more constrained the subjects were in their mobility. In cities, especially in St. Petersburg 
and Moscow, the subjects who were registered temporarily received address tickets that 
they were demanded to retain until their departure (Matthews, 1993: 10-12).
By the mid-19th century, strict control over population mobility became a 
hindrance as the demand for blue collar manpower increased together with industriali-
zation of the urban areas. Issuance of passports became expensive for the impoverished, 
and consequently residents became increasingly reluctant to abide by the rules. In 1894, 
when the Statute on Residence Certiicates was adopted under Alexander III, it was no 
longer demanded that urban residents obtain a permanent permit. When Central Asia was 
annexed to the Russian Empire in the 1860s, the statute loosened control over travels of 
subjects even more.
CONTROL OF MOVEMENT THROUGH LABOR IN THE PERIOD 
AFTER THE 1917 REVOLUTION
After the toppling of the tsarist regime and the establishment of the Bolshevik 
power, management of migration, settlement, and employment gained importance in the 
newly founded socialist state’s policies towards forming a large multiethnic state − one 
in which every member would work to contribute to the favor of the socialist society. 
Following the October revolution, Bolsheviks who had been vigorously criticizing and 
intending to abolish the tsars’ oppressive policies towards the exploited class soon esta-
blished full control over the entire population with the same irmness. What is remarkable 
is that with a similar attitude as the tsars had had towards peasants whose movement they 
had restricted, the Bolsheviks demanded that all former members of bourgeoisie and upper 
11
REMI 2010 (26) 3 pp. 9-30
Migrations during the Soviet Period
classes obtain residence registrations. In doing so, the Bolsheviks compelled the former 
“exploiters” to participate in the military service and socially beneicial labor such as 
construction and maintenance. Holders of registration cards, who were adult men aged 18 
to 45, were obliged to have their employment information entered into their documents 
by their employers and trade unions. This procedure was followed by the policy of “labor 
books” implemented in October 1918 (Matthews, 1993: 16-19). The regulation initially 
applied to all people who had previously belonged to upper classes. Labor books were to 
substitute identity documents and passports. They contained personal data and all infor-
mation on jobs assumed by the holder, who had to update it on a monthly basis at the local 
administrative or police ofices. Most importantly, labor books had a special entry on the 
holder’s place of residence (Matthews, 1993: 16-19). Propiska, the term for “residence 
registration” that emerged initially as an entry in these labor books, was a tit-for-tat instru-
ment of control in the onset of the Bolshevik power. This practice would survive decades 
of state migration policies during and after the Soviet period and would be widely used in 
the ex-Soviet countries.
Shortly after the introduction of “labor books” for members of the formerly upper 
class, in December 1918 RSFSR employment legislation stipulated that every workable 
individual acquire a “worker’s book” (rabochaia knizhka), a document which would 
include information on the place of employment, hours of service, salaries, vacations, sick 
leaves, maternal leaves, rewards, promotions, and penalties. As of February 22, 1922, any 
employment and/or leave of a worker involved permission from the local labor oficials. 
Until recently in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union, a similar document called 
“trudovaia knizhka” (work book) served as evidence for inter alia, determining years 
of work to calculate pension rates. Between 1924 and 1925, after a one-year period of 
liberalization of regulations concerning population movements, a legislation was adopted 
which stated that any person assuming residence for at least three days must register with 
the landlords, administrator of the residence, or a hotel. Individuals receiving visitors had 
to register them with a law enforcement ofice within 48 hours upon their arrival.2 Details 
about the person were to be entered into the “house book” (domovaia kniga) (Matthews, 
1993: 20; Buckley, 1995: 902). This book was to be kept at every abode with a detailed 
record of its residents; it too maintained its signiicance until the 21st century in each of the 
four countries involved in labor migration.
MANAGING MIGRATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZING 
RESTRICTION ON MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE UNDER STALIN
When considering the institutional constraints imposed on the movements of 
people during the Soviet period, it is important to keep in mind the Soviet state’s construc-
tion of nationalities in the 1920s and 1930s. It is during this period that allocation of 
geographical territories of the Soviet republics took place. One of the most important 
historical milestones is the year 1922, which marked the establishment of the Soviet 
2 According to the Federal Law on Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons 
of the Russian Federation adopted in January 2007, the host party is required to notify the Federal 
Migration Service about the arrival of a foreign visitor.
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power in Turkestan − the region which later became known as Central Asia – as well as 
the foundation of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Two years later, 
in 1924, when the delimitation of administrative borders in Central Asia resulted in the 
creation of the Turkmen SSR and the Uzbek SSR, the latter irst included the Tajik ASSR 
into its territory. Tajik ASSR then became Tajik SSR in 1929. Kazakhstan was known as 
Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the RSFSR. To RSFSR belonged also 
Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast’ (Province). In 1936, these administrative unites were 
renamed Kazakh SSR and Kyrgyz SSR, respectively.
In the mid 1920s, the Soviets launched their irst population census. For this 
purpose, they engaged ethnographers who had been working for the Commission for the 
Study of the Tribal Composition of the Population of Russia (Hirsch, 2005). Prior to this 
period, the ethnographers’ primary task had been to gain ethnographic data for the Russian 
Empire during the First World War. Following the October revolution, when they became 
consultants to the Bolsheviks, they were committed to all-Union censuses and partici-
pated in the activities that involved deining the internal frontiers of the Soviet Union. 
The Russian ethnographers carried out ield research in remote areas to conduct in-depth 
study of different peoples of the USSR. However, as Hirsch argues, they did far more than 
merely accumulate data in the remotest places of the USSR; they contributed to a change 
in population composition by applying an approach that Hirsch terms as “state-sponsored 
evolutionism.” According to her, the state, which was marked by a strong Leninist school 
of thought, envisioned the evolution of the population of the USSR. The Soviets, adhering 
to the Marxist ideology of development, held that it was feasible to expedite the evolution 
process by forming nationalities through clustering clans and tribes which in turn were 
deemed to be residuals of the feudal period (Edgar, 2004; Hirsch, 2005).3 Nationalities 
would be formed into socialist-era nations, which some day in the era of communism 
would all be united. In Lubin’s words, “a ‘lourishing of nations’ was to lead to their 
eventual ‘coming together,’ or ‘rapprochement,’ which was ultimately to lead to their 
‘merging’ or assimilation.” (Lubin, 1984: 6).4 Thus, in compliance with the government’s 
oficial list of nationalities, citizens had to choose or declare themselves as belonging to 
an oficial nationality during individual encounters with census-takers (Hirsch, 2005: 9).
A further relevant aspect for the study of post-Soviet migration is the principle 
of “double assimilation” applied by the Soviet regime. The characteristic of this kind of 
assimilation is the co-occurrence of top-down and bottom-up processes, which meant that 
not only did the Soviet government implement measures from above such as delineating 
national borders and publishing an oficial list of nationalities, but also that local elites 
were involved in the decision making and had to ight for resources, land, and power. 
Archival materials bear witness to the fact that even smaller population groups such as 
3 Hirsch’s elaborate work leaves an impression that the creation of ethnicities/nationalities in Central 
Asia occurred mainly beginning with the formation of the USSR, particularly under Stalin. Earlier 
scholarship on Central Asia points out that already in the 19th century the tsars had the tendency 
to perceive of “people” by the language spoken by people (Volk). This German romanticism was 
then passed onto Marxists who advanced their own vision of constructing nations following the 
revolution in 1917 (Roy, 2000: 54).
4 More on “merging” (sliianie) and “coming together” (sblizhenie) of nations, see also Smith (1996: 
8-9).
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peasants protested and complained to higher authorities about inappropriate distribution of 
their territories to the national territorial units they desired not to be part of (Hirsch, 2005; 
Edgar, 2004: 53, 60-61).5
Prior to the formation of the Soviet Union and the enhancement of the state 
nationality policies, the sense of identiication with which Central Asian people asso-
ciated themselves was based on their language, clan, tribe, geographic place, religion, 
and religious and/or noble ancestry (Roy, 2000: 48-60; Edgar, 2004: 18; Hirsch, 2005: 
110-114). The border delimitation and the irst all-Union census of 1926 gradually altered 
people’s sense of self-identiication, as the Soviet republics in Central Asia would include 
national majorities and minorities. Roy points out that the delimitation of these borders 
did not have any geographic, economic, or ethnic rationality. This resulted, as he rightly 
points out, in the emergence of such complex constellations of peoples as the large Uzbek 
population for which the Province of Osh in the south of Kyrgyzstan is known, or the 
ethnic Uzbeks living in Tashauz and Charjau (now Türkmenabad) in Turkmenistan as well 
as Shymkent and Jambul in Kazakhstan. In Tajikistan, the Uzbek speaking population is 
spread primarily in the north in the Sughd Province and the region of Hissor as well as 
some villages in the Province of Khatlon in the south. Similarly, in Uzbekistan, there is 
a large Tajik-speaking population in Buxoro, Samarqand, Surxondaryo, and even in the 
Ferghana Valley and the north of Tashkent. There are ethnic Kyrgyz in the north and south 
of Tajikistan (Roy, 2000: 116-118).6
In the midst of the border demarcation process and creation of nations, the 
party-state was especially responsible for controlling rural out-migration and managing 
mobility of the population. The establishment of the Soviet power resulted in emigra-
tion of thousands of people who opposed the communists. In the Central Asian republics, 
the former upper class people were marginalized and driven from urban to rural areas. 
The formation of socialist collective farms led thousands of better-off peasants to lee 
from the Soviet regime into exile. Particularly in the 1930s, the so-called kulaks, or rich 
peasants/entrepreneurs, were taken under state scrutiny. Repression and execution of the 
kulaks forced a great number of people to seek refuge in Afghanistan, Iran, China, Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, and in Western European countries (Kocaoğlu, 2000). In nomadic regions 
of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, collectivization was used as a 
tool to bring about a sedentary lifestyle. As Edgar argues, nomads were perceived by the 
Soviet administration as people dificult to control, who were opposed to the Soviet power 
5 Edgar points out interesting examples from the 1920s in which Soviet ethnographers were unable 
to determine the nationality of certain nomadic tribes based on their languages. There were cases 
in which the Soviet authorities found it extremely dificult to distribute certain territories during 
the border delimitation process.
6 I refrain from referring to the Tajik-speaking population as Tajiks and the Uzbek-speaking popu-
lation as Uzbeks. The Soviet citizenship passport had a special nationality entry. Following the 
demise of the USSR, when the citizenship passports in each Central Asian country were intro-
duced, the citizens in Central Asian countries were once again confused. Either the citizenship 
passports did not have such an entry (Uzbekistan) or representatives of ethnic/linguistic minorities 
were categorized according to their place of birth, as in the case of Tajiks who were registered 
as Uzbeks since they had been born in Buxoro in the 1940s and moved to Tajikistan during the 
Soviet era. They do not necessarily speak Uzbek.
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and prone to cross the Soviet border to lee. According to Soviet understanding, only those 
who possessed a great deal of wealth were able to afford to lead a nomadic life, as any 
change of place of residence with family and household would require considerable means 
(Edgar, 2004: 195).
The irst Five-year Plan which was launched in 1928 marked a head start towards 
the “modernization of culturally backward people”, sedentarization, and enhancement of 
development through industrialization and collectivization of agriculture (Edgar, 2004: 
88; Collins, 2006: 85).7 At the same time, the Soviets implemented a policy of distribution 
of labor that they coupled with strict migration control. It is in this context that the Central 
Asia region started receiving labor migrants from Russia through orgnabors, an organized 
system of labor force recruitment for the mining industry, railway and motorway construc-
tion, technical personnel for construction of factories and plants, etc. (Shigabdinov and 
Nikitenko, 2000: 104).
In 1932, Stalin issued a decree according to which internal passports were to be 
issued − allegedly − not only in order to gain more precise statistical information from 
urban areas, but also “in order to secure the deportation from these places of persons 
who are not connected with industry or with work in ofices and schools, and who are not 
engaged in socially useful labor (with the exception of inirm persons and pensioners), 
and also in order to cleanse these places of kulak, criminal and other anti-social elements 
inding refuge there…” (Matthews, 1993: 28).
The decree applied to any individual older than 16 years residing in border zones, 
urban areas, or towns (or within 100 km around them).8 Four months after this legislation 
was issued, it was complemented by a further decree determining a list of 25 towns and 
100 km radiuses to which the decree would apply. All other individuals living beyond the 
oficially designated “regime zones” were deprived of passports and were required to be 
registered with the rural district authorities. This meant that minority populations who had 
been allocated to reside in designated territories (army members and, particularly, peasants, 
i.e. collective farmers who constituted a majority among the population) were also Soviet 
citizens, but they had dificulty traveling and seeking residence and employment as they 
wished in the areas which were under strict control through internal passports. Without 
a passport it was impossible to travel to distant locations since boarding trains and buses 
required showing a valid internal passport. Only on a seasonal basis and with the permis-
sion of their supervisors were members of kolkhozes allowed to work in the spheres of 
industry and construction (Lewis and Rowland, 1979: 22). In addition, under the oppres-
sive regime of Stalin, deiance of passport and registration rules was punished. Penalties 
varied from ines to a prison sentence of up to two years; forgery of documents was severely 
prosecuted (Lewis and Rowland, 1979: 22; Matthews, 1993: 28; Garcelon, 2001: 91).
7 Speciically on internal migration control and collectivization, see Garcelon (2001).
8 Hirsch mentions that the internal passport system of the USSR distinguished between three terri-
torial categories: (1) “regime zones,” which encompassed territories of geopolitical or economic 
importance that later would include surrounding regions within 100 km designated as such, as well 
as frontier regions that were located 100 km within the Soviet territories bordering the European 
and Far Eastern states, (2) “non-regime zones,” the term applied to rural regions and provinces, 
and (3) “extra-administrative zones” that included the Gulag (2005: 275).
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In light of the Soviet efforts to develop industry and cotton monoculture 
in Central Asia, arid oases in the south were to be cultivated. Due to a great deicit of 
manpower in these parts of the region, groups of population were relocated involuntarily 
from the Ferghana Valley to these areas. During the period from 1929 until the mid-1950s, 
in accordance with Stalin’s oppressive attitude toward kulaks and other ‘undesired’ 
minority population in Central Russia and Siberia, “special settlements” (spetsposelenie) 
were established in the region where these forced settlers had to reside (Shigabdinov and 
Nikitenko, 2000: 103). A typical example is the deportation of 171,781 Koreans to Kazak 
and Uzbek SSR in the late 1930s, which occurred due to increased Soviet suspicion of 
ethnic Koreans residing in the frontier territories of the Far East. The Soviets feared that 
ethnic Koreans might establish close ties to Korean nationals and Japanese intelligence 
agents with Korean nationality (Shigabdinov and Nikitenko, 2000: 104).
The period during World War II and the years immediately after witnessed, 
despite the strict control on movement, different migration lows including rural-to-urban 
movements due to the increase of industrialization and expansion of urban areas. Migration 
of Slavic population to Central Asia increased during and after World War II, partly related 
to the evacuation of population from Russian territories under the German occupation, but 
also as a result of the transfer of plants, construction of military infrastructure, provision 
of clothing and food supplies, and redistribution of resources during the war (Shigabdinov 
and Nikitenko, 2000: 104). Among the Central Asian republics, Kyrgyz SSR and Kazakh 
SSR had the largest inlow of Russian-speaking migrants in the decades after World War 
II (Islamov, 2000: 181-182).
The onset of World War II and the invasion of the Nazi troops marked the 
deportation of Germans from the Volga Region to Central Asia, their overall number in 
1941-1942 amounting to 1,209,430. Forced relocation of minorities in the USSR was 
not conined only to Germans, however. The number of “special settlements” grew as 
Chechens, Ingushes, Crimean Tatars, Kurds and Greek political migrants were resettled 
forcefully into various regions of Central Asia (Polyan, 2001; Berdinskikh, 2005). For 
instance, a relatively large group of around 60,000 Meskhetian Turks was resettled from 
Georgia to the Ferghana Valley in Central Asia in 1944 (Rubin and Lubin, 2000: 177). 
Almost 40,000 Greeks were relocated from the Black Sea region, mainly to Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan during the same period (Bugai and Kotsonis, 1999: 55, 117).
Notwithstanding the adoption of strict policies such as the introduction of 
mandatory registration at the place of residence and the internal passport system, there 
seems to have been some difference between policy and practice. Lewis and Rowland as 
Buckley state that in reality, those wishing to change their place of residence succeeded in 
doing so by using informal channels. Lewis and Rowland argue that despite the common 
understanding in the West that Stalinist policies severely restricted mobility, one should 
contextualize the migration regulations of that time. The decline of the economy, extreme 
poverty, starvation and collectivization of the 1920s and 1930s led the population to move 
to urban areas. Between 1926 and 1939, as Soviet statistics states, 18.7 million people 
migrated from rural areas into urban areas (Lewis and Rowland, 1979: 25). In spite of the 
limitations imposed on the cities that were oficially “closed” to migrants from outside 
through the notorious propiska (residence permit) regulation, many potential migrants 
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sought different alternatives such as informal practices to attain their goals and eventually 
succeeded in settling. An elaborate study conducted by Buckley shows that in reality, 
the restrictive measures of the Soviets to control the vast growth of the cities were quite 
unsuccessful (Buckley, 1995).
MIGRATION PATTERNS IN THE 1960’S AND 1980’S
The Presence of the Slavic Population in Central Asia
During this period the Central Asian republics experienced a sharp increase of 
demographic growth. The population of the RSFSR slightly declined, with the exception 
of some industrial regions (Gibson, 1991: 152). The statistical data on the changes of 
residence of individuals within the USSR show that the population of the Central Asian 
republics remained relatively immobile, whereas in RSFSR people showed more mobility 
and moved between different regions (Lubin, 1984: 41; Gibson, 1991). For the period of 
1959-1979, the Central Asian republics report the following data on the increase of the 
population among the titular nationalities: Uzbekistan (6.7%), Kyrgyzstan (7.5%), and 
Tajikistan (5.8%) (Islamov, 2000: 182).
With Khrushchev’s arrival to power in 1956 and his policy of de-Stalinization, 
control over workers’ mobility was loosened. Through the orgnabors (the aforementioned 
organized labor recruiting service), the government continued to administer the distribu-
tion of labor force, relocating 28 million people in the period between 1930 and 1970. This 
organized recruitment was not mandatory, however. From 1951 until 1970, the number of 
resettled workers decreased, totaling merely 573,100 in the period of 1966-1970 (Lewis 
and Rowland, 1979: 19; Lubin, 1984: 42-43).
By the mid-1970s collective farmers that reached the age of 15 were permitted 
to obtain internal passports with which they were able to travel longer distances. The 
sources provided by Islamov (2000) suggest that in the time period of 1959-1979, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan saw an increase of 13.1%, 8.5%, and 10.9% of 
ethnic Russians, respectively. By 1970, around 30 million Russians were residing in areas 
primarily inhabited by non-Russians that were located beyond the administrative borders 
of the RSFSR. This number constituted 23 percent of the overall Russian population. 
Between 1979 and 1989, however, more Russians were reported to have left Central Asia 
than to have arrived (Shigabdinov and Nikitenko, 2000: 104). Gibson notes that the number 
of migrants from RSFSR to Central Asia dropped by 50% during the period of 1971-1980 
(Gibson, 1991: 153). The post-Stalinist period was marked by the redistribution of power 
and education and employment opportunities among Russian-speaking professionals and 
representatives of the so-called titular nationality. As argued by Korobkov (2008: 71), with 
regional governing bodies in Central Asia promoting more employment and education 
opportunities for the titular nationality, Russian speakers were pushed to take lower-level 
jobs which in turn led them to leave the region.
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Emigration of the Jewish Population
The period between late 1960s and 1980s is characterized by a large-scale 
emigration of Jews from the entire Soviet Union (including Central Asia). Prior to this 
period, the USSR had never before witnessed a mass permanent outlow of its citizens. 
In September 1968, the Embassy of the Netherlands in Moscow launched the issuance of 
exit permits that would allow Jews immigration to Israel (Buwalda, 1997: 9-11).9 What 
is more, it occurred at the time when very few citizens were given permission to travel to 
foreign countries. By 1971, the outlow of the Jewish minority increased sharply. Within 
this year, at least 13,000 people were allowed to leave. A year after, almost three times as 
many Jews left the USSR for Israel. Buwalda (1997) distinguishes between two waves 
within this exodus of the Soviet Jews. The irst wave is in 1970s when 220,000 people 
emigrated. During this period the majority of Jewish emigrants left for Israel. Between 
1975 and 1987, two thirds of the emigrants preferred to settle in countries other than Israel 
(Dietz, 2000: 639). The second wave started in 1987 and continued through 1991, with the 
number of Jewish emigrants amounting to 300,000 (Buwalda, 1997: 9-11).
The shift from strict controls on travel abroad to sweeping permission of such a 
great number of the population to emigrate in the midst of the Cold War seems remarkable. 
In this context, too, we should address the opportunities and constraints that shaped this 
pattern of migration. Zaslavsky and Brym (1983: 2-3, 64-76) discuss in their joint work 
the extrinsic and intrinsic modes in the scholarship on Jewish out-migration from the 
Soviet Union. The irst of the two approaches links the outlow of the Jewish population to 
external factors occurring in the late 1960s and 1970s. The revival of the Jewish national 
consciousness and the strong desire of the Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel is explained 
as an outcome of the Six Day War in 1967, in which Israel claimed victory, as well as the 
foundation of the state of Israel thereafter. In this context, it should not go unmentioned 
that the Kremlin was against Israel during the Six Day War, and this position had a major 
impact on the Jewish community all over the USSR. A further factor in this approach is 
the pressure which the West exerted on the USSR due to its desire that Jews leave the 
country.10
The second approach is related to social changes occurring within the conines 
of the USSR, and shifts the external factors to the background. The extent to which the 
Jewish out-migration took place is explained in terms of the Soviet preventive policy of a 
sudden deicit in labor force, particularly in the technical and scientiic spheres. A further 
reason is argued to have been individual decision making: some had merely no desire to 
9 The period of the late 1960s and early 1970s is considered by scholars such as Buwalda to be the 
second exodus of Jews. Buwalda points out that the irst exodus of Jews took place in the period 
of 1881-1914 in which roughly 2 million Jews left the Russian Empire.
10 Zaslavsky and Brym provide some details about how Soviet-American trade agreements corre-
lated with the attitude of the Kremlin’s number of permissions for Jews to exit. Thus, in 1972-1973 
when the wheat agreement was signed, between 32,000 and 35,000 emigrants were recorded. The 
Jackson-Vanik amendment, which warned that trade would be blocked if Jews were not permitted 
to leave, caused a decrease of exits. Further wheat accord resulted in an increase of emigration 
permissions, which then declined with the start of the Soviet military actions in Afghanistan in 
1980 and the wheat embargo.
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abandon the society in which they had been brought up, whereas others were induced to 
emigrate by having heard the stories of their friends and relatives.
There are indeed a number of other push and pull factors which cannot be analyzed 
here.11 One of the most important and detrimental implications of the Jewish emigration 
from the Soviet Union has been brain-drain. It is worthwhile to point out this aspect, 
since the onset of brain-drain out of the Soviet Union became discernible in the republics 
of the Central Asian region that had been home to thousands of Jews throughout many 
centuries.12 It is dificult to determine precisely how many Jewish scientists, professionals, 
and skilled workers in total emigrated from Central Asia between 1970 and 1991. On the 
one hand, statistical data accumulation in the Soviet Union is a controversial topic in the 
sense that, in the context of anti-Semitic attitudes towards Jews, some individuals had 
chosen to identify themselves as belonging to different nationalities. On the other hand, 
in their quantitative data and discussions on the issue, some Western scholars (notably in 
the US) seem to have an anti-Soviet bias. What becomes clear is that Soviet authorities 
must have sensed the danger of brain-drain as a serious consequence of emigration when 
they imposed a so-called ‘education tax’ in August 1972.13 According to this regulation, 
every emigrant had to compensate the Soviet state for the free education that they had 
obtained before their departure. The cost of emigration was in some cases as high as ive 
to ten years of wages of a professional employee (Zaslavsy and Brym, 1983: 64). Other 
sources state that the fee was 4,500 rubles for a graduate in the humanities and 19,400 
rubles for a doctor of sciences. Towards the end of that same year, the education fee had 
to be abolished, as the Western countries and President Johnson of the US threatened the 
USSR with sanctions (Buwalda, 1997: 91).
Although Western scholars working on this subject claim that, due to the anti-
Semitism that was present during the Soviet Union, the overall percentage of Jews who 
obtained higher education was only 1% in the entire USSR, having lived in the vicinity 
of a Jewish district, I cannot conirm the accuracy of such a low percentage in Central 
Asia. What became easily noticeable throughout the last two decades of the Soviet era 
was the absence of Jewish academicians, university professors, teachers, medical doctors, 
and scientists. In addition to brain-drain, the emigration of Jews meant the ultimate loss of a 
culture which was unique in its own, that had been developed and passed on through genera-
tions. Inherent to it were architecture, artisanship, music, and art of which almost no traces are 
left, and to which scholars focusing on emigration generally tend to pay too little attention.
11 There is an entire body of research in and outside of the former Soviet Union that deals specii -
cally with Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, including topics such as the Stalinist 
attitude towards nationality policy (Hirsch, 2005; Zaslavsky and Brym, 1983), the rise of anti-
Semitism in Russia (Zaslavsky and Brym, 1983), persecution and discrimination of Jews in the 
USSR (Buwalda, 1997), Soviet Jewish immigrants in Israel (Berthomière, 2003), and the Jewish 
minority population that chose not to emigrate (Ryvkina, 1996).
12 According to the sources provided by Zaslavsky and Brym, the total number Jews in 1970 in 
Uzbekistan was 102,855; Tajikistan, 14,615; and in the Kyrgyz Republic, 7,680.
13 This is not to deny that there was certainly more than mere fear of brain-drain when the authorities 
in the USSR established education fees. The historical passage of movement control in the USSR 
that covers the period prior to the Jewish emigration shows that the authorities most probably 
intended to prevent emigration.
19
REMI 2010 (26) 3 pp. 9-30
Migrations during the Soviet Period
“Friendship of Nations” and Construction of a Multiethnic Soviet 
Society: Education Migration, Internationalization of the Division of 
Labor and Solidarity among Nations
In 1966, an earthquake of 7.5 on the Richter scale devastated the city of Tashkent, 
the capital of Uzbek SSR. Immediately, it became a major incentive for the Soviet 
authorities to reconstruct a new modern city that would embody the Soviet rhetoric of 
the “friendship of nations”. The Soviet urban planners took necessary advantage of the 
damage caused by this natural disaster. They wiped out the majority of the residential 
buildings in the old town of Tashkent. The reconstruction efforts involved construction 
of multi-storied concrete residential buildings, schools, and hospitals, as well as creation 
of new industries and measures to develop infrastructure. This resulted in the inlow of 
thousands of migrants, particularly from the Slavic regions of the USSR. Around 30,000 
people are estimated to have settled yearly during the early 1970s, all of them set to design 
Tashkent as a multicultural city epitomizing the “friendship of nations” (Lubin, 1984: 42; 
Roman, 2002; Sahadeo, 2007).
What is interesting and has been neglected in the research is that immediately 
after the earthquake, some higher education institutions in Tashkent evacuated their 
students and transferred them to the RSFSR. Despite scarce research which has been 
done particularly on the issue of outmigration after the earthquake, empirical data for the 
present study has indicated that some students among this generation settled in their new 
locations in Russia permanently. During my ield research I encountered a case in which 
one of the former students had meanwhile become an important person in a patronage 
network of Central Asian migrants.
Along with the Russiication policies and the efforts to raise the level of education 
in the less-developed peripheries of the USSR such as the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
the late 1960s through early 1980s was a period during which the educated youth, often 
the children of the party cadres and education elites, went to Russia to study at higher 
education institutions. Many of them came back to their region of origin as expected 
and pursued promising careers; some, however, chose to settle in Russia. From 2004-
2007, Sahadeo conducted a survey with this precise category of migrants who had lived 
in the cities of Leningrad and Moscow during the Soviet era, who serve as evidence for 
the existence of an entire generation of education migrants in Russia and who recount 
different attitudes they received in their Slavic host societies (Sahadeo, 2007).
Research conducted by Lubin in late 1970s, which focuses mainly on Soviet 
Uzbekistan, brings two further aspects into the foreground, whose are of great signiicance 
for the present study: irstly, according to Lubin, the Central Asian (speciically Uzbek 
SSR) workable population migrated to the RSFSR for vocational, professional, and educa-
tional purposes. Secondly, she mentions that the Soviet Army served as a channel through 
which male migrants from Central Asia were allocated to different Russian cities. Lubin 
states that no data had been published on those migrants who had chosen not to return 
to Uzbekistan and that the individuals she had interviewed showed strong willingness to 
return to Uzbekistan (Lubin, 1984: 43). However, we do know in the meantime that some 
migrants did opt to stay permanently in Russia. Indeed, census data indicates that in 1959, 
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42,000 Uzbeks were residing outside the territory of the Central Asian region. In 1979 
the number of such migrants doubled, but considering that the number of the Uzbeks in 
the entire USSR was 12.5 million, 91,000 residing outside Uzbek SSR, seems miniscule 
(Lubin, 1984: 43).
According to sources provided by Sahadeo, in 1970 140,000 Kyrgyz, Tajiks, 
Uzbeks, and Turkmens were registered as residents in Russia. This number increased to 
248,000 in 1989 (Sahadeo, 2007: 563). The present study will show that precisely these 
types of pioneer migrants − originating from all Central Asian republics, arriving in the 
1960s and 1970s and staying in Russia, meanwhile maintaining ties to their regions of 
origin − played a crucial role in forming labor migrant networks in the 1990s. As we shall 
see in the course of this study, these actors became signiicant propellers of the inlow of 
cheap labor force. Those whose ties to their homelands had been rather weak beneited 
from their resources in Russia, and established migrant organizations and recruitment 
ofices or have acted as informal job brokers and supervisors.14
Russia’s First Central Asian Labor Migrants?
Military service and education were not the sole purposes for Central Asians to 
migrate to Russia for longer terms. Contrary to the common impression that the current 
mass labor migration from the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union to 
the Russian Federation commenced in the late 1990s, suficient data has been found that 
implies the phenomenon of labor force movement from Central Asia to Russia is not 
characteristic of the post-Soviet period. While I argue that the dynamics of labor migration 
has represented a new challenge to the newly independent states, there was a period not 
too long before 1991 when the Soviet state encouraged the able-bodied population of 
Central Asia to settle in the regions of Russia that had labor deicit for the sake of resource 
allocation and production.
During the 1970s together with urbanization and industrialization in the RSFSR, 
the party-state staged efforts to cultivate the virgin land to increase food supplies, which 
of course required labor force. Soviet demographers criticized and complained about the 
absolute reluctance of Central Asia’s workable population to migrate to different regions 
of the USSR to work. They stated that it was irstly due to a lack of education of Central 
Asians and secondly because the regions in Russia with severe labor deicit were not 
appealing to Central Asians in cultural, social, and material terms. The third argument was 
that the potential migrants were fairly satisied with the environment in which they were 
living, regardless of the economic challenges of the period (Wimbush and Ponomareff, 
1979: 11).
14 Here, we should be cautious about developing the two abovementioned aspects into categories 
such as education/vocation and military migrants as one might be tempted to. Among Lubin’s 
interviewees there were namely those who stayed to study in Russian after the military service, 
which can make clear distinctions dificult. Similar cases emerged during my own ieldwork in 
Russia from 2005-2008.
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It goes without saying that the vast mobility of labor from Central Asian countries 
to Russia since the end of 1990s described in this volume has refuted these statements. 
What should be made clear is that there is signiicant historical data about movements 
of people from Central Asia to RSFSR during the Soviet period. In the second half of 
the 1970s, the Soviets expanded their agricultural development projects in the grey 
and brown earth zones of Moscow and Novgorod (known as the non-black earth zone, 
Rus. nechernozem) that extend to the north and the east of Russia, the territory covering 
Murmansk and the Urals (Wimbush and Ponomareff, 1979). It was planned that by 1980, 
the non-black earth zone would produce one-sixth of the overall agricultural production 
of the whole USSR (Wimbush and Ponomareff, 1979: 18-19). Development of agriculture 
in the non-black earth zone, the lower Volga, and Siberia, as well the establishment of 
Baikal-Amur Railroad, entailed engaging manpower from the regions with more labor 
force (Lubin, 1984: 43, 256; Gibson, 1991: 149). In 1978 the irst group consisting of 
1,200 Uzbeks was sent, and a year later as many as 3,900 were sent to the non-black earth 
zone to contribute to the development of agriculture (Lubin, 1986: 43). While both Lubin 
and Gibson provide us with marginal information on this topic and treat it within a broad 
macro-level study, I was able to explore some details of this phenomenon from newspaper 
articles published in the early 1980s.
In an article concerning Uzbek workers who opted to stay in the non-black 
earth zone, the Tashkent newspaper Yosh Leninchi (Uzb. ‘Young Leninist’) published an 
interview with Uzbek workers of both Slavic and Uzbek origin who expressed their strong 
desire to stay in Novgorod, Russia, and work there “not temporarily, but permanently.”15 
Uzbek workers are quoted as promising that they will not go anywhere “until we turn 
the nonblack earth lands into a productive area…”. According to another report, Uzbek 
workers, as their names suggest, meanwhile married local Russian women, founded 
families, and were provided with apartments (Sahadeo, 2007: 562). They did not return 
to Uzbekistan, even though their training had inished long ago. Uzbek migrants and their 
families are described as living a normal life. More weddings were planned to be cele-
brated the year after the report and concert ensembles from Uzbekistan were reported to 
be on tour in the Russian region.
Newspapers from other Central Asian republics attest that these projects were 
not limited to the Uzbek SSR. The newspaper Kommunist Tadzhikistana reported on May 
15, 1983 that an entire train had left Dushanbe, the capital of Tajik SSR, for Khabarovsk, 
carrying 70 families or more than 300 people, whose average age was 30. This train was 
the second to follow the irst one that had left two months previously with 100 families. 
The report cited the train supervisor as saying that all the migrants [sic] were bound to 
the Far East to live and were skilled people. Experienced drivers, crane truck operators, 
technicians, construction specialists, and engineers with previous professional experience 
speciically in land cultivation projects in Kazakhstan were being sponsored by the Soviet 
15 Notes from the Nonchernozem Zone. Article by Gh. Shermuhamedov, in Yosh Leninchi, 25th of 
March, 1983. United States. (1983). USSR, post report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State. 
The articles which I have been able to consult in the archives were in the form of short reviews 
translated from the original language. The reviews relected relevant press articles published in 
the Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek SSRs during the 1980s. The name Nonchernozem was translated as 
such from Uzbek into English.
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government to work and live in the Far East. G.D. Dzhavov, deputy chairman of the 
Tajik SSR State Committee on Labor, stated that within that ive-year period, Tajikistan 
intended to send 6,000 workers to the Far East. The deputy chairman contended with pride 
that Tajikistan would do its own share in the projects of the Far East.16
Lubin’s indings about Central Asian workers’ deinite plans to return to their 
native regions resulted from her ieldwork which she had carried out in the late 1970s, 
i.e. shortly after these projects started. We can see from sources dating to several years 
later though, that a considerable number of these migrants did opt to stay. The scarcity 
of data on Kyrgyzstan does not mean that its population was not affected by organized 
interregional labor. As far as this country is concerned, only one source mentions that in 
the 1980s approximately 30,000-40,000 workers were engaged from Kyrgyzstan in other 
Soviet republics, among their 6,000-9,000 are reported as students from the Kyrgyz SSR. 
They were involved mostly in construction sites, in groups known as stroiotriads (Abazov, 
2000: 231).
A further aspect which is particularly relevant in the context of migration and 
labor is again the rhetoric of the “friendship of nations” with which these migrant workers 
were mobilized. Among the workers from Central Asia there were both ethnic Slavic and 
Central Asian nations, as the names of the persons suggest. What is really remarkable 
is the way the interviewees stress that they had been working in a multiethnic environ-
ment. As one engineer states, his group consisted of “representatives of 14 nationalities 
working sellessly.”17 Attention should be drawn also to the “group approach” with which 
the Soviet leadership mobilized the outmigration of Central Asians. By sending entire 
groups or collectives, as they were called, the leadership intended to facilitate the adjust-
ment of these workers in the region of arrival. In 1976, according to the decree of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU, Uzbek SSR was commissioned to assign construction 
trusts or groups to carry out land reclamation work in Novgorodskaia and Ivanovskaia 
oblasts within the framework of the aforementioned non-black earth cultivation project.18 
In Novgorod, for instance, the trust was called Uznovgorodstroi and had 2,500 members 
in 1979. In addition to irrigating and draining land and constructing houses, schools, and 
hospitals, the trusts had to found state farms and give them as gifts to their oblasts before 
16 “Bon Voyage� Tadzhikistan to the Aid of the Country”, L. Serebrennikov L., in Kommunist 
Tadzhikistana, 15th of May, 1983. United States. (1983). USSR, post report. Washington, DC: 
US Dept. of State.
17 Notes from the Nonchernozem Zone. Article by Gh. Shermuhamedov in Yosh Leninchi, 25th of 
March, 1983. United States. (1983). USSR, post report. Washington, DC: US Dept. of State.
18 Construction “trusts” (in Russian trust) consist of a group of industrial or commercial enterprises 
with centralized direction (cf. Oxford Russian-English Dictionary, 1973). The oficial name of 
the resolution was “Ob obiazatel’stvax kollektivov vodoxoziaistvennykh i stroititel’nykh organi-
zatsii Uzbekskoi SSR po okazaniiu pomoshchi Ivanovskoi i Novgorodskoi oblastiam v vypolnenii 
postanovleniia CK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov SSSR po dal’neishemu razvitiiu sel’skogo xoziaistva 
nechernozemnoi zony RSFSR.” [On the obligations of groups belonging to organizations in 
charge of water management and construction of the Uzbek SSR in its assistance in Ivanovsk and 
Novgorod Provinces in the framework of the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU on 
further development of agriculture in non-black zone of the RSFSR] (Wimbush and Ponomareff, 
1979: 14, also Ref. 35).
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their departure, as it was planned to make the region a major supplier of vegetable, meat, 
and dairy products. The two state farms in Novgorod were proudly named Tashkent and 
Druzhba (Rus. “friendship”).
These examples describe that, irstly, the Soviet state made efforts to design a 
multicultural society and promoted cooperation between different republics. Secondly, by 
creating facilities for Central Asian youths to study outside of their region of origin, espe-
cially in the RSFSR and by sending young recruitees from the region to serve in the Soviet 
Army, the ‘merger of nations’ was sponsored further. Thirdly, through shifting different 
skilled human resources between the regions within the USSR, the Soviet state supported 
its own development through migration strategy that should be addressed as characteristic 
in its own way. Ultimately, studies conducted by Sahadeo, Roman, and Hirsch contend 
that the Soviet ideology of internationalization privileged Russians over non-Russians and 
thus engendered more ethnic discrimination towards the non-Slavic population in Russia.
MIGRATIONS IN THE LATE 1980’S AND THE DEMISE OF 
THE USSR: WITHER “FRIENDSHIP OF NATIONS” AND 
“BROTHERHOOD OF PEOPLES”?
In June 1989, when the USSR was facing a major economic crisis, interethnic 
clashes took place in the Ferghana Valley of Uzbek SSR between Uzbeks and the 
Meskhetian Turks who had been resettled during the Stalinist period. A ight that started at 
a small market kindled major violence against Meskhetian Turks in the cities of Ferghna, 
Kokand, Marilan, and Namangan. According to oficial reports, 171 people died as a 
result of the violent clashes and the vast majority of them were Meskhetian Turks. (Rubin 
and Lubin, 2000: 45-46; Megoran, 2002: 243). As a reaction to these clashes, the Soviet 
government relocated almost all 15,000 Meskhetians out of Uzbekistan (Rubin and Lubin, 
2000: 45-45, 177).
In the following month, in July 1989, ethnic clashes broke out between Tajiks 
and Kyrgyz in the Isfara Raion in the north of Tajikistan that borders with Kyrgyzstan. 
Around 5,000 ethnic Kyrgyz refugees from Tajikistan settled in the south of Kyrgyzstan 
(Smith, 1996: 397). A series of other inter-ethnic violence acts followed suit.19 In mid-
February in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, there was a failed attempt of a coup d’état. 
Opponents of Mahkamov, the First Secretary of the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR, 
plotted it by spreading rumors that thousands of Armenians leeing from the clashes in 
Nagorno-Karabakh would be provided with housing and employment. The riot which was 
triggered by these rumors cost the lives of 22 people. As a result, representatives of ethnic 
19 To these events one can add the inter-ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in 
Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 1990. More on this in the context of economic crisis in Kyrgyzstan, 
see Abazov (1999). Not much research has been done however, with regard to the impact of 1990 
inter-ethnic clashes on the out-migration ethnic Uzbeks. While the author is cognizant of the most 
recent June 2010 violent inter-ethnic clashes in Southern Kyrgyzstan, this topic cannot be treated 
in this article. Furthermore, it will have to be seen to what extent the population from the South, 
both ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz will choose to migrate to other countries.
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minorities such as Russians, Germans, Armenians, and Bukharan Jews, a total number of 
about 100,000, left Tajikistan (Smith, 1996: 380). The same false rumors about Armenian 
refugees settling in Frunze (now Bishkek), Kyrgyzstan resulted in mass protests. Although 
the skirmishes in Bishkek did not have any consequences related to migration, the ideology 
of “friendship of nations” and “fraternity of peoples” which had been meant to construct a 
multiethnic society in the USSR was shattered.
In 1989, approximately 25.3 million Russians were residing beyond the 
borders of the RSFSR, which corresponded to 18.5% of all Russians living in the USSR 
(Zaionchkovskaya, 1999: 11). The late 1980s marked the period during which Gorbachev’s 
liberal policies and reforms had corollaries such as the rise of national self-conscious-
ness, the declaration of Central Asian republics of their respective titular language as 
the oficial language, and the replacement of Russian party cadres by representatives 
of the titular nations. The latest waves of the Jewish emigration became concatenated 
with the permanent move of the Russian speaking population toward the RSFSR or the 
regions where Russian was still an oficial language, such as Kazakhstan. Towards the last 
years of perestroika and the beginning of independence, emigration of ethnic Russians 
to Russia increased rapidly. According to some sources, the number Russians living in 
Kazakhstan decreased from 6 million to 4.5 between 1989 and 1990. For the same period, 
the Kyrgyzstan lost around 34% of its ethnic Russian population. In Turkmenistan, where 
the percentage of Russians had reached 9.4 of the entire population in 1989, there are 
currently two percent of Russians residing (Peyrouse, 2007: 246-247). Additional incen-
tives for Russian outmigration were the economic crisis in the USSR that resulted in wage 
differences between Russia and Central Asia as well as ethnic clashes that broke out in the 
region, which in turn bore discriminatory attitudes towards Russians that had until then 
been treated with privilege.
Towards the last years of the perestroika period, the USSR’s emigration 
procedures became less strict, its relations with the Western countries improved, and 
reuniied Germany started welcoming ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union. 
Ethnic Germans who had been resettled during the Stalinist period in the Central Asian 
region and had started emigrating in fairly small numbers already during the 1970s began 
leaving in masses in 1990. The remaining Jews emigrated as well, switching their desti-
nation from Israel to the USA, then in addition to Western Europe, making Germany their 
primary destination in the 1990s.
MIGRATION PATTERNS IN CENTRAL ASIA AND RUSSIA IN 
THE 1990’S: THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND FURTHER 
INCREASE OF EMIGRATION AND MOBILITY RATE
Between 1990 and 1999, Germany received 1.63 million ethnic Germans 
from the former Soviet Union in the framework of the German repatriation program 
(Spätaussiedler). Approximately 120,000 Jews emigrated from the ex-Soviet countries to 
Germany as well (Dietz, 2000: 1). The majority of these emigrants belonged to families 
who had been resettled forcefully during the Stalinist period to the Central Asian region, 
mainly to Kazakhstan. According to the data provided by the Statistical Committee of the 
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Commonwealth of Independent States, 49,505 ethnic Germans left Kazakhstan in 1997 
(IOM 1999: 76). From Kyrgyzstan, 2,183 ethnic Germans emigrated to their historical 
homeland within the same year (IOM, 1999: 91). The statistical information indicates that 
the number of ethnic Germans tended to be much smaller for other Central Asian countries 
for 1997. Uzbekistan, for instance, recorded the emigration of 917 ethnic Germans, 
Turkmenistan recorded 345, and Tajikistan, only 247. The reason for this stark diffe-
rence is not only the large proportion of forced settlement of ethnic Germans primarily in 
Kazakhstan, but also the fact that many ethnic Germans emigrated already in the earliest 
years of the independence of their countries of residence and at a time when Germany 
did not yet require language proiciency for entry into Germany, i.e. prior to 1996. This is 
particularly true for Tajikistan where the outbreak of ethnic clashes and the Civil War in 
1992 resulted in massive emigration and a sharp decline in the number of ethnic Germans. 
Whilst in 1989 33,000 ethnic Germans were registered as residing in Tajikistan (IOM, 
1999: 139), the number of ethnic Germans and Jews that left Tajikistan between 1990 and 
1992 amounted to 230,000, taken together (Bushkov, 2000: 155).
The emigration of ethnic Germans was not the only migratory consequence of the 
Civil War in Tajikistan. The violent clashes of 1992-1997 led other ethnic minorities as 
well thousands of Tajikistanis to leave the country. During this period 697,653 Tajikistanis 
were registered as internally displaced, however the majority returned to their place of 
origin in 1997. Thousands led to Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
and Russia. The Russian Federal Migration Service reported in 1998 that 50,192 refugees 
and 126,625 forced migrants were residing in the Russian Federation. The majority of 
those who had led to countries other than Russia had repatriated to Tajikistan when the 
conlicting parties signed a peace treaty in 1997. Those Tajiks who had been granted 
refugee status in Russia stayed permanently and have meanwhile obtained Russian citi-
zenship. In 1997-1998, together with half of the 60,000 Tajiks who had led to Afghanistan 
from the Civil War, Tajikistan received approximately 2,500 Afghans who had led from 
the armed conlicts in Afghanistan. These people have meanwhile obtained refugee status 
in Tajikistan (IOM, 1999: 139-140).
The Russian-speaking population continued emigrating from all the Central 
Asian republics. Kazakhstan, while experiencing a major outlow of population, allowed 
all persons with Kazakh ancestry residing outside the borders of the republic to return to 
their historic homeland. By the mid-1990s, notwithstanding the repatriation of approxi-
mately 160,000 ethnic Kazakhs from the neighboring countries and due to large-scale 
emigration of ethnic minorities, the population of this country dropped from 17 million to 
15 million. In 1998, the Government of Kazakhstan implemented a state-sponsored repa-
triation program in order to alleviate the demographic crisis. The program was conceptua-
lized to facilitate the settlement of repatriates (oralman) by offering assistance to employ-
ment, access to a number of social beneits, and support of repatriates through integration 
programs (Darieva, 2005).
Similar to Kazakhstan, albeit on a much smaller scale, Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan also allowed ethnic Kyrgyz and Turkmen migrants to return to their respec-
tive historic homelands from neighboring countries, although the governments have not 
yet opted to provide the returnees with inancial means. The International Organization 
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for Migration is currently working together with NGOs and the Kyrgyz government to 
promote the development of a legal framework for a return project of ethnic Kyrgyz called 
kairylman (returnee).
Poor ecological conditions around the evaporating Aral Sea (Karakalpak 
Autonomous Province and Xorazm Region in Uzbekistan) forced thousands move to 
different areas. By 1997, the number of ecological migrants was reported to have reached 
16,000. Besides the economic crisis affecting all the republics of the former Soviet Union 
with the transition to the market economy, the governments of the Central Asian republics 
were confronted with challenges regarding domestic and foreign policies. Managing the 
migration of the population was hence not at the top of their agenda. Although the newly 
independent countries adopted their own citizenship policies and introduced citizenship 
passports that enabled their residents to travel rather freely, challenges such as irregular 
migration, illegal border-crossing, and traficking in human beings did not gain much 
attention. Only towards the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century did the 
governments start making efforts to solve these problems.20 Apart from Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, three countries of the region, viz. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, 
have witnessed a large outlow of irregular labor migrants to Russia since the late 1990s 
and early 2000. According to oficial sources, there are approximately 5-7 million labor 
migrants in the Russian Federation and half of them are estimated to be from Central 
Asian countries (IOM, 2008).
CONCLUSION
We have seen in this article that labor migration from Central Asia to Russia as 
it exists today has been structured by a complex array of political, economic and social 
factors. Through the historical trajectory of migrations from the earliest days of the Soviet 
Union until its demise in 1991, it has been illustrated that the population of the Soviet 
Union not only had strict constraints to movement but also was subject to forced reloca-
tions between different regions. Nonetheless, Soviet citizens increasingly engaged them-
selves in rural-to-urban migrations which expanded the urban population to a considerable 
extent. As far as Central Asia is concerned, it has been shown that the region continuously 
experienced as much in-migration as out-migration of people.
It has been illustrated in this article that labor migrants from Central Asia to 
Russia started to arrive already during the Soviet period. The current low of labor force 
is therefore not an entirely new phenomenon. The party-state managed labor migration 
of Central Asia’s workable population to Russia in the late 1970s and early 1980s was to 
enhance production through the cultivation of virgin lands. Together with Central Asian 
recruitees in the Soviet Army in Russia and Central Asian students at Russian higher 
education institutions, this generation of pioneer labor migrants may have played a signi-
icant role in the formation of migrant networks.
20 See IOM reports between 1999 and 2002.
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In studying the current patterns of migration and, in particular, increased labor 
migration, we should bear in mind the ethnic heterogeneity of the population in this 
region. The three countries of origin (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) share a 
common Soviet past: it started with the annexation of their historical territories to the 
Russian Empire, the process of administrative territorial border demarcation in the 1920s 
and 1930s and the creation of nationalities by the Soviet state, and it continued as the states 
underwent the Sovietization processes, including the ideological project of ‘friendship and 
brotherhood of nations’ that gradually molded the society in the region.
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Migrations during the Soviet Period and in the Early Years of USSR’s 
Dissolution: A Focus on Central Asia
Delia RAHMONOVA-SCHWARZ
Contemporary mass low of labor migrants from particularly Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan to Russia is a topic which has been increasingly attracting the attention researchers on 
Central Asia. Yet how new is this phenomenon really? This article illustrates migrations between 
Central Asia and Russia from the early years of the Soviet period until the beginning of a new era 
marked by the fall of the USSR. It explains the opportunities for and constraints on population 
mobility during the Soviet period. Strict control of population movements and forced resettlement 
programs which took place especially during the Stalinist period inluenced the ethnic composition 
in the region. This article also elaborates on the party-state’s management of labor force in the late 
1970s and early 1980s especially state-supported migration to Russia to enhance production through 
the cultivation of virgin lands.
Migrations pendant la période soviétique et après la in de l’URSS : 
regard sur l’Asie centrale
Delia RAHMONOVA-SCHWARZ
Les lux contemporains de travailleurs migrants originaires du Kirghizstan, du Tadjikistan 
ou bien encore d’Ouzbékistan vers la Russie sont devenus un objet de recherche parmi les spécial-
istes de l’Asie centrale. Cet article vise à dresser un panorama de ces migrations du début de la 
période soviétique jusqu’aux premières années de la période post-soviétique. L’auteure décrit les 
dynamiques migratoires et la diversité des facteurs qui ont pu conduire à un accroissement ou à 
une restriction des lux. Elle analyse les conséquences du contrôle strict opéré sur les mouvements 
de populations et les déplacements forcés pendant le stalinisme et sur la composition ethnique de 
l’espace centre asiatique. Enin l’auteure explore les politiques migratoires de l’Union soviétique 
liées à la gestion de la main-d’œuvre et au développement économique des terres vierges de Russie.
Migraciones durante el período soviético y los primeros años después de 
la caída de la URSS: acento en Asia central
Delia RAHMONOVA-SCHWARZ
El lujo contemporáneo de los trabajadores migrantes procedentes de Kirguistán, 
Tayikistán y Uzbekistán hacia Rusia es un tema que atrae cada vez más la atención de los investiga-
dores sobre Asia central. Sin embargo podemos preguntarnos si se trata realmente de un fenómeno 
nuevo. Este artículo ilustra las migraciones entre Asia central y Rusia desde el principio del período 
soviético hasta los primeros años después de la descomposición de la Unión soviética. Explica las 
oportunidades y restricciones de la movilidad durante el período soviético. El estricto control de 
los movimientos de población y los programas de desplazamiento forzados durante el estalinismo 
han inluenciado la composición étnica de la región de Asia central. Este artículo evoca también la 
gestión de la mano de obra por el partido-Estado a inales de los años 70 y principios de los años 80, 
y en particular la migración hacia Rusia apoyada por el estado con el in de favorecer la producción 
mediante la explotación agrícola de terrenos rusos vírgenes.
